淺談選股法

早前應承網友天曉分享一下我怎樣選股,其實好難短短一篇文章交待清楚.所以今次只會好簡略地寫出概括.有意見不妨提出,好讓大家可一齊分享及討論一下.
在我從選股到買股的過程裹, 我大至會做以下幾樣.

1. Identifying(尋找期)

因筆者是比較喜歡發掘潛力股,所以會經常從各方面收集資訊,例如上網,報紙,雜誌及期刊.內容特別留意社會時事,經濟及潮流.另外跟人討論也好重要.註:收集資料的確幾花時間,不過好值得.

2. Analysing (分析期)
鎖定了有潛質行業或企業就可進行做針對性研究.我喜歡先做qualitative study (e.g.Management, business model, Market potential, Industry nature etc.), 然後是quantitative study (e.g.finanical health, financial ratio, industry data etc.).另外,也會找出同行業不同公司作比較.註:我是非常著重管理層的.

3. Valuating (估值期)
和其他人的估值方法大至相同,離不開那些如PE,PEG,DCF,PB,EV等方法.不過,我認為一定要識得靈活運用,因為鱼每種股值法也有其盲點.註:筆者很小用DCF法,因為其中涉及太多假設,如果掌握不好,好容易變為陷阱.

4. Planning (策略制定期)

若果鎖定一隻心水股,我會先決定它的屬性,然後衡量它是否適合放入我的portfolio裹面(這個因人而異,沒有portfolio的就不用做).我會看它是否切合投資組合的策略及步署.註:即是說,就算係好股也未必一定會買入!

5. Executing (執行期)

如合格,那麼就會決定買入數量,亦會就市場環境而決定買入價和大約分多少次買入.註:建議分段買入,這樣好多時候都可以拉低平均成本價.

我的做法大至上是這樣.但是沒有固定形式.我的投資技巧現在仍然在不斷轉變中,很努力地希望找出最適合自己及最有效的方法.今次暫且寫小小,遲些有機會再分享多些.

不過我認為方法固然重要,但心法更加不可忽視.我會比喻方法為外功而心法為內功,而正如武學一樣,武藝高強者無不是內功深厚的.

 

被'移動'的中移動

今次電訊業重組一出,中移動就不斷下跌.其實重組的方案基本上是跟大部份人的預期差不多,在未有更多細節下,暫時對它的中短期影響應該有限.不過,我認為今次的下跌好正常,我的看法比較簡單,我覺得好大程度是基於Risk-Free premium 之下降.以往因為它的壟斷地位,市場給予它的估值一定會很高(幾高當然由市場決定), 而現在這個Risk-Free Premium 受到沖擊,估值很難避免不下跌.
雖然無論從公司實力,現金流,網絡複蓋率來看中移動在國內仍然是全無對手.但由於它是受國家政策主導性很強的企業,換句話說,它亦有可能在未來同樣被國策所牽制.所以,其實'風險'這條尾巴一直存在,只是以往人們不太重視吧了.我看它雖然是一隻好股,不過它的中長遠前景亦不是真的如一般人所想像中那麼穩如泰山.
我始終認為,那些打算買了它後把它放落床底十年載不理的長線投資者,還是應該慎重些,擺返出來得閒望下較為穩妥.

P.S.電訊業一向不是我喜愛的行業,投資中移動純綷基於用Bottom-up的選股結果.

三部委關於深化電信體制改革的通告:

http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2008/05/24/art_2001_45730.html

2008 投資組合--------------------------------------------------------

公司 購入年份 平均成本 現在價格 08至今獲利 累積獲利

中國人壽       2003      $4.8       $30.9      -23.4%       544%

思捷環球       2004      $41.7      $92.3      -20.4%       121%

恆安國際       2007      $19.7      $27.7      -20.9%       41%

招商銀行       2007      $12.8      $37.8      -12.7%       117%

百麗國際       2007      $9.05      $8.5       -27.8       -6%

中國移動       2008      $114       $114.7      0.6%        1%

註:所佔比重在5%以上,次序跟據買入年份.

平安保險       2008      $55.6      $63.65      14.5%       14%

寶姿時裝       2008      $22.6      $24.7       9.3%        9%

安踏體育       2008      $8.08      $8.55       5.8%        6%

註:所佔比重在5%以下,次序跟據買入年份.

 

一切源自增長

在坊間經常聽到闕於Growth Stock Investing, 其中代表人物有Peter Lynch, Philip Fisher.如果能夠掌握固中聽精要及發揮得宜,它的威力確是非常強大的.以下轉戟了一篇精采訪問,大家不妨看看這位高手的演譯,比較一下和大家心目中的有否出入.

隨意想到的公司可能是阿里爸爸,安踏體育…

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Jack Laporte has been managing the $6.3 billion New Horizons Fund at T. Rowe Price since 1987 The New Horizons Fund is one of the largest and most respected small cap funds in the world. In his reign, Laporte has delivered an 11.8% yearly return, 1.6 points better than the S&P 500 and 5.5 points better than the Russell 2000 Growth Index.

Michael Moe: Jack, How long have you run the T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund now?

Jack L: I've been running the New Horizons Fund since 1987, so 18+ years, I've been at T. Rowe Price for 29 years, so I've been around here a long time.

As you probably know, New Horizons is T. Rowe Price's 2nd oldest mutual fund; it goes back to 1960. Mr. Price, a lot of people call him the father of growth stock investing, first started with a concept that large-cap growth companies were the best place to invest, whereas back in the '40's and '50's, most people only believed that they could own common stocks if they had high dividend yields, Mr. Price said you ought to own companies that can compound their earnings and compound their dividends at above average rates.
Then, in 1960, when New Horizons was started, he came out with a new idea which is that small companies could have higher sustainable growth and that investors ought to look at small cap growth companies, so that was the genesis of how the New Horizons Fund started.

MM: Jack, as you look at companies that you invest in, what are some of the key characteristics that you are looking for?

JL: I'm looking for companies that I can invest in and own for a long period of time. And because I'm taking that longer-term focus, I'm looking at a number of different characteristics. Generally, for a successful, rapidly growing small-cap company, I'm looking for a founder who is a visionary and entrepreneurial CEO who's come up with a unique, industry-changing business strategy. I'm looking for companies that have decent cash flow and hopefully can finance the majority of their growth internally.
I don't like capital-intensive companies. I like companies that operate in very large fragmented industries where there's an opportunity to gain share over time. I like businesses with high recurring revenues. I like companies with above-average profitability in terms of ROE or ROIC and I like sustainable, organic sales and earnings growth. Those are some of the characteristics.


MM: How important is the management team to an investment decision, and secondly, how do you evaluate a management team?

JL: Well, the second question is the trickier one. The management team is critical in investing in small cap companies. What I've found is an excellent management team in a small company can do well operating in a mediocre industry category. One that comes to mind is 10 or 15 years ago I invested in several small steel companies that had a unique business model which was a non-unionized mini-mill, less capital intensive business model for the steel sector, and they took incredible share...

MM: Oregon Steel?

JL: Oregon Steel, Birmingham Steel, there were a number of them, and what you found was a great management team operating in a mediocre business at least for a period of time could take a significant share and the stockholders were well rewarded. The flip side is also true in that a management team that doesn't have its head screwed on right can mess up the best of businesses and fritter away shareholders' capital.

That's why the management team is critical I said earlier that in the real long-term, most major long-term growth winners of tend to have visionary, entrepreneurial CEO's. Oftentimes, however, those companies need to make a transition to a management team that can manage the growth beyond the evolution of the business idea, and there's a need to turn the management over to a more professional management team from the entrepreneurial one that created the business to begin with.


MM: When you look at some of the big winners you've had in the past, what are some examples that you would point out?

JL: Some of the big ones, starting with the more recent, Apollo Group was certainly a major winner, which we invested in on the IPO back in December of '94, and while the company has struggled for the last 18 months, it's still up almost a hundred times since the IPO. If I can digress for a second, that gets to the heart of what I'm trying to do in running the New Horizons Fund and something that I think distinguishes the way I look at managing a small-cap growth fund from how others invest.

I'm looking to invest in companies that I can own for a long period of time, 3-5 years, or in many cases even longer. In Apollo's case, it's over 10 years. Many of my top ten holdings I've owned for 5-10 years and the benefit of that is when you find a great company that can compound their earnings at well-above average rates, really the shareholders benefit if you hold it for a long period of time.
The way the math works when I look at what growth investing is, it's really taking advantage of the power of compound earnings growth. That, in a nutshell, is what it's all about. As you know, if you own a company whose earnings can grow at 15% a year for 10 years, after 10 years, the earnings will have quadrupled, so if the P/E stays the same, the stock would quadruple. If you can find a company that can grow its earnings 20% a year for 10 years, those earnings will be up 6 fold over 10 years, and so the stock at a constant P/E is going to be up six fold.

So to transfer that into Apollo's case, Apollo's earnings compounded at around 40% a year for 10 years, the P/E expanded a little bit, and lo and behold, that turns into a 100 factor. Where I think most growth investors, so-called growth investors, fall down is they don't think about the power of compound earnings growth. Rather, they focus on trading into the latest fad or the latest sector that is showing above-average growth.
The thing that distinguishes New Horizons is that the average turnover rate in the portfolio is about 25% a year now, meaning that I hold a stock for an average of 4 years. The turnover rate according to Morningstar of Lipper in the small-cap growth category is about 125% so what that says is that I hold a stock on average for 4 years and the average manager of a small cap growth fund holds a stock for less than 1 year.
I don't see how you can do well as a growth investor just churning the portfolio so rapidly. I think it's a fruitless exercise because growth investing is all about finding great businesses, great managements, and investing in those companies over a long period of time.
MM: What are some of the mistakes you've made, and what have you learned from them?

JL: Certainly, a mistake that I've made a couple of times, including in the case of DaVita back in the late '90's, I was investing in a very attractive business with a management team that I thought was only ok. And it turned out the management team was less than ok and they almost ran it into the ground.
Thinking that a business is so attractive that it will offset the fact that the management team was not an "A" management team, is a mistake that I've made. Another mistake is not being willing to pay what you should for a truly unique outstanding growth company. If you think about what I said earlier about the power of compound growth, if you find a company that can grow their earnings at 20% a year for an extended period of time and have a high degree of confidence that that can happen, you should be willing to pay a very high P/E on current earnings.

I think I fall under the trap sometimes of saying, "Ah, this is a great company with a great management, but it's too expensive." Well if it really is a great company with a great management, you should want to look through the current price which might look a little bit expensive on current earnings and realize that if you're buying it on the basis of earnings out two or three years, it's actually very cheap. That's a mistake that most growth investors make.

MM: How much time, if any, do you spend evaluating the valuation of the overall market or how aggressive you should be buying stocks or not?

JL: Well, it's not my job to make a market call on the whole market. I think investors in New Horizons Fund want to have exposure to small, growth companies and they're making the asset allocation decision themselves. They don't' want me going to 50% cash because I think the sector might look a little overvalued.

I tend to run my portfolio pretty fully invested at all periods of time with reserves rarely getting over 5% of the portfolio. I'll go back on what I was saying about mistakes that investors make which would be not being willing to pay enough for a great growth company and not holding their great stocks long enough. The best example of that for the New Horizons Fund, way before I even joined T. Rowe Price, was Wal-Mart. New Horizons Fund bought Wal-Mart on its IPO back in 1970.
We held the stock, although we trimmed it along the way, until 1983. We made a ton of money, it was a very successful investment., but we finally sold it because it could no longer be called a small company, that was in 1983. When I look back at that sale and had my statistician go back and look at that sale, about 15 years later, what we found was that if we had held our maximum Wal-Mart position, it would have been bigger than our whole fund! There was a real lesson in that.

I learned not to sell your great companies too soon, which is a reason I've held onto winners as they've grown well out of the small cap area into the mid cap stage. It is hard enough to identify true growth companies. Once you do, don't make the mistake of selling them too quickly.

反智

同事甲: 這個'logo'的尺寸可否改小一點點,跟放在上一款產品之大小一樣可以嗎?

同事乙: 不是之前開過會,決定了嗎?,點解現在要改呢?

同事甲: 是的.不過還有時間改動一點痳.

同事乙: 但為何要改呢?

同事甲: 想跟上一款產品一樣好些.

同事乙: 點解要同之前一樣?

同事甲: 好似好些嘅.

同事乙: 點好法呢?

同事甲: 總之好些啦..

同事乙: 改了之後跟現在差幾多?

同事甲: 唔係好多啫,差0.5mm.睇唔出嘅.唔駛擔心,唔多覺嘅,hehe.

同事乙: 唔多覺(茫然)???吓!你既然話分別唔大,咁改黎有乜用呢?

同事甲: 係就係...hmm

同事乙: 改完都睇唔出,不如唔好改.你話係唔係先呢?

同事甲: (冇癮)好啦,咁暫時照做住先,等我同我部門商量下再覆你吧.

當然,這件事最後都是不了了之.

職場上這些反智的事情實在很多.不過投資市場上又何嘗不是!

好多時都不外乎是基於(自尊)Self-ego, (自身利益)Self-Interest, 貪念和恐懼這等等因素...

護城河

巴菲特常常提及護城河(Moat),意指公司的保護網,即是說一間公司有甚麽獨到之處維持著本身的內在價值及優勢,輕易地被取代或擊破.我想這是做每一項長期投資前要考慮的一個重要因素.而根據不同類型的行業, Moat的型式也相對有所不同.在服裝和消費電子產品行業,品牌知名度和可信賴度起著關鍵的作用,而在製造行業裹,規模效益和成本優勢就顯得非常重要.我想資深投資人也都知道.

除了股票投資,Moat概念也可套用在物業投資上,最近熱賣的御龍山會是一個好例子.它以豪宅定位,用馬場景作賣點,高級用料和過十億會所作包裝,配上意大利風情,原支來真是可以吸引到好多投資者入市.不過以現在高價買入作長期投資的價值有多小,我都幾好奇.因為我所理解的Moat概念,自身的長期優勢不是輕易被對手大灑金錢就可以擊破,就好似在有限供應的半山地段豪宅我明白,又或是未來滙聚商業/文化/住宅於一身的西九龍區,我都明白.而位處火炭工業區,僅離遠側望沙田馬場景的御龍山賣著豪宅的價錢就顯得有點古怪了.

或者是我的多疑,我對這項’投資’沒多大好感.不過地產市場和股票市場一向好相似,越是熱鬧的地方越是吸引到多人去參與…

2008 投資組合--------------------------------------------------------

公司          購入年份 平均成本    現在價格   08至今獲利   累積獲利

中國人壽       2003      $4.8       $33.05     -18.1%       589%

思捷環球       2004      $41.7      $92.55     -20.2%       122%

恆安國際       2007      $19.7      $28.15     -19.6%       43%

招商銀行       2007      $12.8      $31.05     -2.5%        143%

百麗國際       2007      $9.05      $8.8       -25.3       -3%

中國移動       2008      $114       $133.9      17.5%       17%

註:所佔比重在5%以上,次序跟據買入年份.

平安保險       2008      $55.6      $70.55      26.9%       27%

寶姿時裝       2008      $22.6      $24.85      10%         10%

安踏體育       2008      $8.08      $8.89       10%         10%

註:所佔比重在5%以下,次序跟據買入年份.

 

“十萬不覺多,一蚊不嫌小”

剛發生的四川大地震非常可怕,雖然身處香港,也能透過電視和報章感受到他們失去家人及朋友的那份悲痛.作為普通市民,能做的真的多,唯有積極捐款,以表達對他們的一份支持和鼓勵,希望他們能堅強地生活下去.

之前參加過苗甫行動,有一位資深前輩曾經對我說,”捐款嘅嘢,十萬不覺多,一蚊不嫌小”.言下之意是捐款是一份心意,隨每個人本身的能力而定,如果你袋中只得兩元,而捐出一元,那就是非常之多了,反之亦然.

正如中國龍工主席李新炎，在捐贈儀式上向災區人民捐款500萬元。他說：「這個500萬對災區來講，只能解決一些非常小的事，但是作為我們來說，奉獻了我們的一份愛心，希望災區人民能夠克服更多的困難。」

我巳把捐款給予紅十字會,聯絡如下.希望大家也支持一下!

http://www.redcross.org.hk/donationhkrc/chi/person01.htm#1

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關於捐款,近日紛紛看到內地企業報導它們的捐款額.當中有多有小.引來各方面的好大回響.今次不是想就捐款額多小而作評論. 筆者今次想指出的是企業責任.早前曾經在一個講座上聽到一位香港上市公司主席提出應否以上市公司名義捐款,因為企業代表着股東的利益,未得股東通過好似不大恰當.這令在場其餘來自內地的主席一時之間懂如何應對,因為他們都沒想過這問題.
不過那位香港老闆隨後說到,其實用個人及管理層名義捐款也未嘗不可.香港人果然識變通,好嘢!

不知各位又是否同意這位知名的香港老闆睇法呢?

閉關

閉關? 講下笑而已.其實只是想暫時不出文章,專心點處理好自己的一些事吧了.另外,亦可趁這機會整理一下自己的投資知識.

幾時寫返? 我當然想越快越好啦.

遲些見!